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RESTREPO, Circuit Judge  
 
 Aaron Edmonds Tyson handed his gun to Otis Powell 
and waited in the getaway car while Powell shot and killed two 
men in a stopped van.  A jury in Monroe County, Pennsylvania, 
convicted Tyson of two counts of first-degree murder as an 
accomplice.  In seeking post-conviction relief in state court, 
Tyson claimed his trial counsel was ineffective for not 
objecting to the court’s erroneous instruction, which he argued 
allowed the jury to find him guilty without finding he 
possessed the requisite intent to kill.  After the state court 
deemed the claim meritless, Tyson pursued a habeas petition.  
The District Court held the state court reasonably applied 
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federal law in finding his trial counsel was not ineffective and 
denied relief.  For the reasons set forth below, we disagree and 
will reverse the District Court.    
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
 
The Pennsylvania Superior Court summarized the facts 
of this case as follows: 
On April 24, 2002, [Tyson], [Powell] and Kasine 
George (“George”) were riding in a vehicle.  At 
some point, [Tyson] exited the car and, when he 
returned, stated that two white boys had just 
pulled a gun on him.  George described [Tyson] 
as angry at that time.  [Tyson], who was at that 
point a passenger in the car, took a 9 millimeter 
handgun from the center console.  He racked the 
slide of the gun, thus arming it.  [Tyson] told 
Powell, who was driving, to pull out from the 
location where the vehicle was parked.  
[Tyson] pointed to a van and indicated it was 
being driven by the two who had pulled a gun on 
him.  With Powell driving, the three followed the 
van to a club.  When the two white men entered 
that club, Powell gave George a knife, directing 
him to puncture the tires on the van.  George did 
so to at least one of the tires.  When George 
returned to the car, [Tyson] was in the driver’s 
seat.  Powell was now a passenger and he asked 
[Tyson] for the gun.  After five or ten minutes, 
the two white men exited the bar, entered the van 
and left the location.  
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With [Tyson] now driving, the three again 
followed the van.  It eventually stopped due to 
the flat tire.  At that point, [Tyson] and his two 
companions were going to exit the car, but 
Powell told the other two to wait.  Powell then 
walked to the van.  As he did so, [Tyson] backed 
the car to a point where he and George could see 
what was transpiring at the van.  At that point, 
Powell shot its two occupants, Daniel and Keith 
Fotiathis. . .. He then ran back to the car.  Powell, 
George and [Tyson] left the scene.  [Tyson] 
drove the vehicle.  The three discussed whether 
they should go to New York but eventually 
decided to return to their nearby home.  
Commonwealth v. Tyson, 947 A.2d 834 (Pa. Super. 2008) 
(unpublished memorandum) at 6-8, appeal denied, 605 Pa. 
686, 989 A.2d 917 (Pa. 2009).   
Brothers Daniel and Keith Fotiathis died from the 
gunshot wounds inflicted by Powell.  Tyson was charged with 
being an accomplice to two counts of first and third-degree 
murder and tried by jury in May of 2006.  Kasine George, who 
was later arrested on unrelated drug charges, provided 
information to the police and testified for the Commonwealth 
at trial.  Tyson was found guilty as an accomplice to the first-
degree murders of the Fotiathis brothers.  In July 2006, the trial 
court sentenced him to the mandatory term of life 
imprisonment without parole. 
Under Pennsylvania law, the specific intent to kill is an 
element of first-degree murder.  Commonwealth v. Thomas, 
194 A.3d 159, 167 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 2018).  To be guilty as an 
accomplice in Pennsylvania, a person must act with the same 
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intention of promoting or facilitating the crime as the principal.  
18 Pa.C.S. § 306(c), (d).  Thus, to be guilty as an accomplice 
to first-degree murder, the state must prove the accused 
possessed the specific intent to kill.  Commonwealth v. Speight, 
854 A.2d 450, 460 (Pa. 2004).  See also Everett v. Beard, 290 
F.3d 500, 513 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Pennsylvania law has clearly 
required that for an accomplice to be found guilty of first-
degree murder, s/he must have intended that the victim be 
killed.”) (abrogated on other grounds, Porter v. McCollum, 
558 U.S. 30, 130 (2009)).  
At trial, the Commonwealth’s theory of the case was 
that Tyson was guilty because he assisted the principal, Powell.  
In his closing argument, the prosecutor stated that the “rule” in 
Pennsylvania is “if you help a shooter kill, you are as guilty as 
a shooter.”  A-885.  He expounded on this statement with an 
analogy:  
So in a bank robbery, when there’s a look out 
sitting outside the bank and he tells his friends 
who are armed now, don’t go shooting any bank 
guards.  Go and get the money and come back 
out.  And I am going to stay in the car and we 
will drive off and live happily ever after.  And 
the two friends go in a shoot a bank guard.  Guess 
what? He is as guilty as they are even though he 
told them not to shoot because the law can 
sometimes be sensible, especially with a 
criminal. 
A-885-86.  The prosecutor concluded the explanation by 
stating that “anyone who is with the shooter . . . either helped 
to drive a vehicle, providing the vehicle, handing the gun over, 
slashing the tire, any of those acts make those people equally 
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guilty of the criminal offense as a helper, as an accomplice. 
That is beyond any doubt whatsoever.” A-886.   
The Commonwealth’s explanation of accomplice 
liability was a misstatement of Pennsylvania law.  The court’s 
jury instruction reinforced this misstatement and similarly 
failed to convey that an accomplice to first-degree murder must 
possess the intent to kill.  After emphasizing that Tyson was 
charged as an accomplice, not the principal, the court defined 
both first and third-degree murder by focusing entirely on the 
mental state of “the killer.” A-926.   In explaining the elements 
of first-degree murder, the court mistakenly identified Powell 
as the accomplice and told the jury he committed an intentional 
killing, stating that “in this case – not this Defendant – but Otis 
Powell killed them as an accomplice with the Defendant, 
Aaron Tyson.  And this was done with the specific intent to 
kill.” A-927.  The instruction was further marred by the court 
mistakenly naming the elements of first-degree murder as the 
elements of third-degree murder.  
The court’s instruction for accomplice liability was 
general and not tied to either murder charge.  Instead, the court 
explained that Tyson “is an accomplice if with the intent to 
promote or facilitate the commission of a crime he encourages, 
requests or commands the other person to commit it or agrees 
or aids or agrees to aid or attempts to aid the other person in 
planning, organizing, committing it.” A-930 (emphasis added).  
The court finished its explanation with a circular statement: 
“You may find [Tyson] guilty on the theory that he was an 
accomplice as long as you are satisfied beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the crime was committed; that [Tyson] was an 
accomplice of the person who actually committed the crime.” 
A-930.  The court failed to mention that, under Pennsylvania 
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law, an accomplice to first-degree murder must intend to 
promote or facilitate a killing. 
After the instruction concluded, the court entertained 
the jury’s request for clarification on the degrees of murder.  It 
reiterated the elements of first and third-degree murder, this 
time correctly, but again focused entirely on the intent of the 
“killer” without citing the requisite mens rea of the 
accomplice.  A-948.   It then practically directed the jury to 
find for first-degree murder because, “in this particular case,” 
the charge of being an accomplice “almost by definition  . . . 
encompasses the concept of first degree murder,” while the 
charge of accomplice to third-degree murder is “offered as 
another possibility even though it does not fit as well within 
the confines of the explanation because counsel agreed you 
may consider that as a possibility.”  A-950-51.1   
Tyson appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, 
raising numerous claims not relevant to this appeal, and the 
court affirmed his conviction of two counts of accomplice to 
first-degree murder.  In November 2010, Tyson filed a timely 
pro se petition and accompanying brief in accordance with the 
Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) before the trial court.  In 
his petition, Tyson stated he was “deprived of his 
Constitutional Rights to Due Process and right to effective 
assistance of counsel.” A-172.  In the accompanying brief, 
Tyson articulated that Pennsylvania law requires proof that an 
accomplice to first-degree murder possess the specific intent to 
the kill.  A-178.  He alleged that the trial court’s instruction did 
 
1 The jury was instructed on third-degree murder after the court 
suggested to defense counsel that such an instruction would be 
appropriate.  A-916-17.   
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not convey this burden of proof to the jury, in violation of his 
due process rights under federal law.  A-179. 
Counsel was appointed and filed an amended PCRA 
petition, which expounded upon Tyson’s claim that, based on 
federal law, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 
the trial court’s instruction.  PCRA counsel argued an objection 
was warranted because “[t]he instruction as given could easily 
have confused the jury as to what kind of intent must be shown 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  A-182. 
A PCRA hearing was held before the trial court in 
October 2011.  Tyson’s post-conviction counsel questioned 
trial counsel about his failure to object to the accomplice 
instruction; trial counsel responded that he did not remember 
the charge.  A-973.  In subsequent briefing, post-conviction 
counsel reiterated the ineffective assistance claim, arguing that 
trial counsel’s failure to request an instruction on the mens rea 
required for accomplice liability “is a tremendously important 
point” because the intent to kill “means the difference between 
murder in the first degree and murder in the third degree.”  A-
188.   
 The trial court denied Tyson’s PCRA petition finding 
that, inter alia, counsel was not ineffective for failing to object 
to the jury instruction because it provided a definition of 
accomplice liability and the elements of first-degree murder.  
Citing portions of the instruction, the court concluded that, on 
the whole, it conveyed the Commonwealth’s burden to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Tyson possessed “the shared 
specific intent to kill the Fotiathis brothers.” A-151.  The court 
bolstered the denial of the ineffectiveness claim by stating that 
the evidence presented to the jury “revealed that [Tyson’s] 
conduct was willful, deliberate and premeditated and that he 
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actively participated in the murders by aiding the shooter.” A-
151. 
Tyson appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, 
which affirmed the findings of the trial court and denied post-
conviction relief.  Adopting the “cogent” reasoning of the 
lower court, the Superior Court agreed that the ineffective 
assistance claim was meritless because the instruction 
sufficiently conveyed the requisite mens rea for an accomplice 
to first-degree murder.  A-052.  It affirmed the trial court’s 
denial of PCRA relief.  
In October 2013, Tyson filed a pro se writ of habeas 
corpus in the Middle District of Pennsylvania raising four 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.2  In deciding the 
instant claim regarding counsel’s failure to object to the 
accomplice liability instruction, the District Court found that 
the Pennsylvania Superior Court assessed the claim on its 
merits and it had therefore been exhausted in state courts.  
Accordingly, the District Court applied the standard of review 
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), and concluded that the 
Superior Court reasonably applied clearly established federal 
law in determining that Tyson’s trial counsel was not 
 
2 The District Court stayed Tyson’s habeas petition so that he 
could pursue his second and third PCRA petitions in state 
court, both of which were denied by the PCRA court as 
untimely.  The Superior Court affirmed both denials.  After the 
denial of the third petition, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 




ineffective for failing to object to the accomplice liability 
instruction.  A-12-13. 
Tyson appealed to this Court, which granted a 
certificate of appealability limited to “his jury instructions 
claim under both the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause, see Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991), and the 
Sixth Amendment, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687 (1984).” A-23.  As per the certificate’s instruction, 
the parties addressed the District Court’s determination that the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim had been exhausted in 
state court and was not procedurally defaulted.  A-22-23.   
II. Exhaustion and Procedural Default 
Under AEDPA, a federal court may grant habeas corpus 
relief if it concludes the petitioner is in custody in violation “of 
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”  28 
U.S.C. § 2254(a).  Petitioners in state custody may bring a 
habeas petition only if they have properly exhausted the 
remedies available in state court, assuming such remedies are 
available and can effectively redress the petitioner’s rights.  28 
U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).  Exhaustion requires a petitioner to 
“fairly present” their federal claim’s “factual and legal 
substance to the state courts in a manner that puts them on 
notice that a federal claim is being asserted.” Robinson v. 
Beard, 762 F.3d 316, 328 (3d Cir. 2014).  Because 
Pennsylvania law prevents a defendant from raising an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal, 
Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 738 (Pa. 2002), a 
defendant exhausts an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
in the Commonwealth by raising it in the first petition for 
collateral relief under the PCRA, see Bey v. Superintendent 
Greene SCI, 856 F.3d 230, 236-37 (3d Cir. 2017).  
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 In his pro se PCRA petition, Tyson asserted that his 
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s 
erroneous instruction, which violated his due process rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.  He cited both this Court’s 
decision in Laird v. Horn, 414 F.3d 419, 430 (3d Cir 2004), 
which held that an instruction that failed to explain that an 
accomplice to first-degree murder must possess the intent to 
kill violated the accused’s due process rights, and the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. 
Huffman, 638 A.2d 961 (Pa. 1994), which held that the specific 
intent to kill is an element of the crime of accomplice to first-
degree murder that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
in accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).   
 Tyson’s pro se pleading, which was later utilized in his 
counseled petition, was sufficient to fairly present his federal 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim to the state 
court.  McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 
1999) (“To ‘fairly present’ a claim, a petitioner must present a 
federal claim’s factual and legal substance to the state courts in 
a manner that puts them on notice that a federal claim is being 
asserted. … Yet, the petitioner need not have cited ‘book and 
verse’ of the federal constitution.”)3 
 
3 Upon denial of his claim by the Superior Court, Tyson was 
not required to seek review in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
in order to exhaust his claim.  See Pennsylvania Bulletin: 
Exhaustion of State Remedies in Criminal and Post–
Conviction Relief Cases, 30 Pa. Bull. 2582 (2000) (stating 
effective immediately, following adverse order from Superior 
Court or Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, petition for rehearing 
or allowance of appeal no longer required in post-conviction 
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 The Commonwealth contests this conclusion, arguing 
that both the underlying due process claim and the ineffective 
assistance claim must be exhausted before this Court can 
conduct habeas review.4  It maintains that Tyson’s due process 
challenge was not fairly presented to the state court because it 
was not raised on direct appeal.  Because the claim would be 
deemed waived under Pennsylvania law, the Commonwealth 
argues the doctrine of procedural default prohibits this Court 
from addressing the alleged due process violation on habeas 
review.   
 We disagree that the due process claim can be regarded 
as separate and distinct from the ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim.  Addressing the claims independently of one 
another would require us to disregard the analysis conducted 
 
relief matters to exhaust state court remedies for purposes of 
federal habeas proceedings). 
 
4 “The doctrine of procedural default prohibits federal courts 
from reviewing a state court decision involving a federal 
question if the state court decision is based on a rule of state 
law that is independent of the federal question and adequate to 
support the judgment.” Fahy v. Horn, 516 F.3d 169, 187 (3d 
Cir. 2008).  “A state procedural rule is ‘adequate’ if it was 
firmly established and regularly followed’ at the time of the 
alleged procedural default.” Bey, 856 F.3d at 236 n.18 (quoting 
Ford v. George, 498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991)).  Here, the 
Commonwealth argues the due process claim was procedurally 
defaulted because a rule of Pennsylvania law would deem it 
waived on post-conviction review.  For the reasons explained 
above, this argument is unpersuasive because the due process 
claim was raised within the ineffective assistance claim, which 
a rule of Pennsylvania law found cognizable.   
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by the state court.  Moreover, because Tyson did not raise the 
due process claim on direct appeal, it is only cognizable under 
Pennsylvania law through the lens of an ineffective assistance 
claim on post-conviction review.  The Superior Court held 
Tyson’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to 
the court’s instruction because the instruction did not violate 
Tyson’s due process rights.  Applying the proper standard of 
review under AEDPA, the District Court concluded the 
Superior Court’s determination constituted a reasonable 
application of clearly established federal law as announced in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  It is this 
conclusion we now review on appeal. 
III. Standard of Review 
 In denying habeas relief, the District Court did not hold 
an evidentiary hearing nor engage in independent fact-finding.  
Accordingly, “we apply de novo review to its factual 
inferences drawn from the state court record and its legal 
conclusions.” Mathias v. Superintendent Frackville SCI, 876 
F.3d 462, 475 (3d Cir. 2017).  
 Because we have concluded the state court decided 
Tyson’s ineffective assistance claim on its merits, we review it 
in accordance 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by AEPDA.5  
 
5 We recognize, in affirming this finding by the District Court, 
that there is a presumption that the state court adjudicated a 
claim on the merits “in the absence of any indication or state-
law procedural principals to the contrary.”  Harrington v. 
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011).  The presumption holds even 
if the state court did not analyze or even cite Supreme Court 
decisions in reaching its conclusion.  Even “[w]here a state 
court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation,” the 
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Section 2254(d) provides this Court with the statutory 
authority to grant habeas corpus relief for petitioners in state 
custody, stating:   
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on 
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 
judgment of a State court shall not be granted 
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on 
the merits in State court proceedings unless the 
adjudication of the claim— 
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, 
or involved an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the 
United States; or 
(2)  resulted in a decision that was based on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts in 
light of the evidence presented in the State 
court proceeding. 
  We are concerned here with whether the Pennsylvania 
courts’ application of clearly established federal law was 
unreasonable.  That is an objective inquiry.  Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000) (“a federal habeas court 
making the ‘unreasonable application’ inquiry should ask 
whether the state court’s application of clearly established 
federal law was objectively unreasonable”).  Under AEDPA 
review, “a habeas court must determine what arguments or 
 
habeas petitioner has the burden of proving the state court’s 
denial of relief was the result of an unreasonable legal or 
factual conclusion.  Id. at 98.  
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theories supported or, . . .  could have supported, the state 
court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible 
fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or 
theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of 
[the Supreme] Court.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102.  
 Here, the Superior Court found that Tyson’s trial 
counsel was not ineffective.  In so doing, it applied 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court law that counsel is presumed 
effective unless the appellant proves: 1) the underlying claim 
has arguable merit; 2) counsel’s course of conduct “did not 
have some reasonable basis designed to effectuate [the 
appellant’s] interests;” and, 3) “but for counsel’s 
ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable probability that the 
outcome of the challenged proceedings would have been 
different.” Commonwealth v. Fulton, 830 A.2d 567, 572 (Pa. 
2003); A-48. 
 This Court has repeatedly recognized that 
Pennsylvania’s test for ineffective assistance of counsel is 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland 
because it requires “findings as to both deficient performance 
and actual prejudice.”  Mathias, 876 F.3d at 476.  See also 
Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 106 n.9 (3d Cir. 2005); Werts v. 
Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 204 (3d Cir. 2000).   Here, the Superior 
Court found the court’s jury instruction sufficiently conveyed 
the Commonwealth’s burden to prove Tyson possessed the 
intent to kill.  Because the underlying due process claim was 
deemed to have no arguable merit, the court held counsel could 
not be ineffective for not objecting to the instruction.  The 
District Court found this decision constituted a reasonable 




IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 
A.  Counsel’s Performance 
We begin our analysis with the first prong of Strickland, 
examining whether the Superior Court’s decision that counsel 
acted reasonably was contrary to clearly established federal 
law. “To establish deficient performance, a person challenging 
a conviction must show that ‘counsel’s representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness.’” Harrington, 
562 U.S. at 104 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).  To 
obtain relief, Tyson must prove the alleged errors were “so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ 
guaranteed [to him] by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687.  “Generally, trial counsel’s stewardship is 
constitutionally deficient if he or she ‘neglect[s] to suggest 
instructions that represent the law that would be favorable to 
his or her client supported by reasonably persuasive authority’ 
unless the failure is a strategic choice.” Bey, 856 F.3d at 238 
(quoting Everett, 290 F.3d at 514).   
 We recognize that “[e]ven under de novo review, the 
standard for judging counsel’s representation is a most 
deferential one” and that, under AEDPA review, that deference 
is heightened.  Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105.  “When § 2254(d) 
applies, the question is not whether counsel’s actions were 
reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable 
argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential 
standard.”  Id. See Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 15 (2013) 
(“When a state prisoner asks a federal court to set aside a 
sentence due to ineffective assistance of counsel …, our cases 
require that the federal court use a ‘doubly deferential’ 
standard of review that gives both the state court and the 
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defense attorney the benefit of the doubt.” (quoting Cullen v. 
Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 190 (2011)). 
Tyson argues that counsel’s inaction permitted the court 
to instruct the jury that they could convict him of first-degree 
murder as an accomplice without finding he possessed a 
specific intent to kill – in effect, allowing the Commonwealth 
to not prove an element of the crime.  The Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the government to 
prove each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).  “This bedrock, 
‘axiomatic and elementary’ principle” prohibits a jury 
instruction that lessens the prosecution’s burden of proof.  
Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 313 (1985) (quoting In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. at 363).  If the instruction contains “some 
‘ambiguity, inconsistency, or deficiency,’” such that it creates 
a “reasonable likelihood” the jury misapplied the law and 
relieved the government of its burden of proving each element 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the resulting criminal conviction 
violates the defendant’s Constitutional right to due process.  
Bennett v. Superintendent Graterford SCI, 886 F.3d 268, 285 
(3d Cir. 2018) (citing Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 
190-91 (2009) (internal citations omitted)).   
When a habeas petitioner claims the jury instruction 
was unconstitutional, “we have an independent duty to 
ascertain how a reasonable jury would have interpreted the 
instructions at issue.”  Smith v. Horn, 120 F.3d 400, 413 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (citing Francis, 471 U.S. at 315-16).  We exercise 
this duty by “focus[ing] initially on the specific language 
challenged,” Francis, 471 U.S. at 315, and then considering the 
“allegedly constitutionally infirm language . . . in the context 
of the charge as a whole” to determine whether there is a 
reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instructions in a 
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manner violative of the accused’s due process rights.  Smith, 
120 F.3d at 411.  
 Reading the instant instruction through this lens, we 
find a strong likelihood the jury convicted Tyson as an 
accomplice to first-degree murder without finding he 
possessed the specific intent to kill.  Indeed, we could find no 
language in the instruction that would lead the jury to connect 
the requisite intent to kill to the role of an accomplice. 
 The instruction began with the court’s definition of 
malice, the mens rea element for murder, as encompassing 
“one of three possible mental states which the law regards as 
being bad enough to make a killing a murder.” A-926.  It 
instructed the jury to find malice “if the killer acts with the 
intent to kill, or secondly, with an intent to inflict serious bodily 
harm, or third, [with] that wickedness of disposition . . ..”  A-
926 (emphasis added).  The instruction therefore conveyed to 
the jury that the only relevant mental state was that of the killer; 
it neither referenced nor explained the requisite mental state of 
an accomplice. 
 The court next provided confusing definitions of the 
different degrees of murder, initially identifying the elements 
of first-degree as third-degree murder.  From there, the 
instruction affirmatively informed the jury that Powell – whom 
it mistakenly identified as an accomplice – possessed the intent 
to kill:  
With third degree murder the elements of the 
offense . . . that the Commonwealth must prove 
is that Daniel and Keith Fotiathis are dead – and 
I think there’s not a question that they are dead. . 
. . Secondly, that in this case – not this Defendant 
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– but Otis Powell killed them as an accomplice 
with the Defendant, Aaron Tyson.  And this was 
done with [the] specific intent to kill.  Malice.  
Specifically, specific intent to kill is a fully-
formed intent to kill.  And one who does so is 
conscious of having that intention.  But also a 
killing with specific intent is killing with malice.  
If someone kills in that manner that is willful, 
deliberate [and] premeditated like in this case 
stalking or lying in wait or ambush, that would 
establish specific intent.   
A-927 (emphasis added).  Defense counsel did not object to the 
court’s mistake as to the degree of murder, which likely 
confused the jury but arguably did not prejudice Tyson.  The 
absence of an objection to the court’s explanation of the mens 
rea element of first-degree murder, however, is indefensible.  
The court inadvertently identified the actual shooter as an 
accomplice, and then informed the jury the facts of record 
established the killings were intentional.   The instruction 
comes close to identifying Tyson, who the court had already 
identified as the alleged accomplice, as presumptively guilty of 
first-degree murder.  The court in no way conveyed the 
Commonwealth’s burden to prove that Tyson acted with the 
specific intent to kill.  It instead conveyed to the jury that 
Powell’s presumed intent to kill would render Tyson guilty as 
an accomplice to first-degree murder.   
 The court’s instruction on third-degree murder led the 
jury further astray: 
In third degree murder the killer must again act 
in such a manner that there is malice [and] that 
the person who is the victim must be dead.  And, 
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again, the connection with the person who did 
the killing is such that there has to be a direct 
connection.  Remember what I said about 
malice? . . . It is a shorthand way of referring to 
three different possible mental states that the 
killer may have that the law would regard making 
a killing a murder. 
 A-927 (emphasis added).  As with the instruction on first-
degree murder, the court identified the requisite intent of “the 
killer” without mentioning the mens rea of the accomplice.  
The circuitous reference to an accomplice as someone with a 
“connection with the person who did the killing” implies guilt 
so long as the connection is “direct.”  But a “direct connection” 
does nothing to convey that Tyson and “the killer” must each 
have had a specific intent to commit murder.  Instead both 
instructions imply the jury must only determine Powell’s state 
of mind in determining Tyson’s guilt as an accomplice.   
 The court’s instruction on accomplice liability only 
made it more likely that a reasonable juror would 
misapprehend the law.  Rather than convey the crucial point 
that an accomplice must intend to kill to be guilty of first-
degree murder, the court’s explanation was general and defined 
an accomplice as one who intends to promote or facilitate “a 
crime:” 
You may find the defendant guilty of the crime 
without finding that he personally performed the 
acts required for the commission of that crime.  
The Defendant is guilty of a crime if he is an 
accomplice of another person who commits the 
crime.  He is an accomplice if with the intent to 
promote or facilitate the commission of a crime 
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he encourages, requests or commands the other 
person to commit it or agrees or aids or agrees to 
aid or attempts to aid the other person in 
planning, organizing, committing it.  
You may find the Defendant guilty of a crime on 
the theory that he was an accomplice as long as 
you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the crime was committed; that the Defendant was 
an accomplice of the person who actually 
committed the crime.   
A-930 (emphasis added).6  Tyson argues that this general 
instruction on accomplice liability directs the jury to find him 
 
6 This instruction is substantially different than the current 
Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instructions 
for accomplice liability for the crime of first-degree murder, 
which reads:  
A person can also be guilty of first-degree 
murder when he or she did not cause the death 
personally when the Commonwealth proves 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he or she was an 
accomplice in the murder. To be an accomplice 
in a murder, the defendant must have himself or 
herself intended that a first-degree murder occur 
and the defendant then [[solicits] [commands] 
[encourages] [[[[[[[[requests] the other person to 
commit it] [or] [[aids] [agrees to aid] [[[[or] 
[[[[[attempts to aid] the other person in planning 
or committing it]. 
PA-JICRIM 8.306(B)(4). In the accompanying note, the 
committee recognizes that accomplice liability “is offense 
specific,” meaning that guilt attaches to the charge if the 
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guilty of first-degree murder if he intended to assist with the 
commission of any crime.  He contends a reasonable juror 
could have interpreted this instruction to mean Tyson was 
guilty as an accomplice if he intended to confront the victims, 
but not kill them, or intended to enable a separate crime, such 
as Powell’s illegal possession of a firearm or threatening the 
victims with a crime of violence.   
 We agree.  This Court has previously held that, when a 
specific intent instruction is required, a general accomplice 
instruction lessens the state’s burden of proof and is therefore 
violative of due process.  Smith, 120 F.3d at 412-14.  As with 
the instruction in Smith, the trial court here did not identify the 
crime to which accomplice liability should attach; nothing in 
the charge tied the mental state of an accomplice to that of a 
murderer.  The result was an implication that if Tyson was an 
accomplice to “a” crime, he was an accomplice to any crime 
also committed, including first-degree murder. Smith, 120 F.3d 
at 414 (instruction violative of due process because it was 
reasonably likely jurors convicted Smith of first-degree murder 
based on the finding that he was an accomplice to robbery).7   
 
accomplice had the intent to assist in the commission of the 
specific offense.  See note, PA-JICRIM 8.306(a).   
 
7 Tyson argues the instruction created a “strong likelihood” that 
the jury believed “his life as a drug dealer” constituted “a 
crime” with regard to his accomplice liability. Appellant’s Br., 
26.  However, the court instructed the jury not to infer guilt 
from evidence of his drug dealing.  It directed jurors to find 
Tyson guilty if they believe “he did, in fact, act as accomplice 
in the death of Keith and Daniel Fotiathis and not because 
[they] believe he is convicted [of] or committed these drug 
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 After the instruction concluded, the jury understandably 
requested the court to clarify the difference between first and 
third-degree murder.  In response to this request, the court 
reinforced the inference that Tyson’s mens rea was not relevant 
in deciding his guilt:  
First degree murder is when a killer has a specific 
intent to kill.  And there are three elements.  The 
first is that Keith and Daniel Fotiathis are dead. . 
. . And the second is that the killer actually killed 
them.  That would not be Mr. Tyson.  But the 
killer actually killed these people.  Mr. Tyson is 
an accomplice, is what the Commonwealth 
charges.  And, thirdly, that these killings were 
accomplished with a specific intent to kill and 
with malice.   
A-948-49 (emphasis added).  The court distinguished Tyson’s 
role from that of “the killer” but omitted the requirement that 
the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that Tyson intended 
for the Fotiathis brothers to be killed.  The instruction 
repeatedly and consistently instructed that the only relevant 
inquiry is whether “the killer” acted with specific intent.  It 
stated that “[a]ll that is necessary is they have enough time so 
the killer does actually form the intent to kill;” and “[y]ou can 
infer [the specific intent to kill] from the evidence if you find 
the killer used a deadly weapon in this case.” A-950.  The 
 
offenses.” A-944.  The jury is presumed to follow a court’s 
instruction and we therefore conclude the jury did not find him 
guilty due to evidence of his drug dealing. See Weeks v. 
Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000) (citing Richardson v. 
Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987)). 
 
 24 
instruction altogether eliminated the mens rea element of 
accomplice liability for first-degree murder.  
 Finally, the trial court ended its clarification by 
discouraging the jury against finding that the double shooting 
constituted the lesser offense of third-degree murder: 
In this particular case because there is a charge 
of an accomplice almost by definition it 
encompasses the concept of first-degree murder 
by its very definition, an accomplice with the 
planning and the coordination if you, in fact, 
found to be so indicate [sic] that was first degree 
murder.  But third-degree murder offered as 
another possibility even does not fit well within 
the confines of the explanation because counsel 
agreed you may consider that a possibility.  
A-950-51 (emphasis added).  There is a reasonable likelihood 
the jury understood this passage as a strong suggestion by the 
court to convict Tyson of first-degree murder, and that finding 
him guilty of third-degree murder would be inappropriate.  The 
court ostensibly urged the jury to find Tyson guilty as an 
accomplice to first-degree murder because it believed the facts 
supported such a verdict.  
 We have not found, and the Commonwealth has not 
provided, a portion of the charge that corrects these consistent 
misrepresentations of the law.  The instruction conveyed that 
Tyson’s guilt as an accomplice hinged upon the principal’s 
mental state until it finally “removed the discretion that the jury 
could have otherwise exercised” and directed it to find Tyson 
guilty as an accomplice to first-degree murder.  Bey, 856 F.3d 
at 239.  Because the instruction eradicated the prosecution’s 
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burden to prove the mens rea element of an intentional killing, 
it plainly violated Tyson’s due process rights.   
 In light of the instruction’s profound impropriety, we 
conclude that trial counsel acted unreasonably in failing to 
object.  The failure to object was particularly glaring given that 
the prosecutor’s closing argument contained the same 
erroneous interpretation of Pennsylvania law.  The prosecutor 
told the jury that “whoever was involved in this shooting is a 
murderer.  Either the shooter, or any helper, who under 
Pennsylvania law, is an accomplice.”  A-885.  Through the 
analogy of the look-out who told his co-conspirators not to 
shoot the bank guards but was still guilty of the bank guard’s 
murder, the prosecutor informed the jury that a “helper” who 
plainly did not possess the intent to kill was guilty of murder 
as an accomplice.  Although the counsel’s arguments “‘carry 
less weight with the jury’ than the trial court’s instructions,” 
the Commonwealth’s blatant misstatement of the law certainly 
“increased the likelihood that the jury interpreted the charge so 
as to relieve the Commonwealth of its burden of proof.”  
Bennett, 886 F.3d at 287-88 (citing Sarausad, 555 U.S. at 195) 
(internal citations omitted).8  
 
8 The prosecutor’s argument confounded general accomplice 
liability with accomplice liability.  To be guilty as an 
accomplice under Pennsylvania law, there must be evidence 
that the defendant intended to aid or promote the underlying 
offense, and that the defendant actively participated in the 
crime by “soliciting, aiding, or agreeing to aid the principal.”  
Commonwealth v. Murphy, 844 A.2d 1228, 1234 (Pa. 2004). 
To be guilty as a co-conspirator, a defendant must enter into an 
agreement with another to engage in the crime, and he or a co-
conspirator must commit an “overt act” in furtherance of the 
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 Despite the absence of any instruction directing the jury 
to find an essential element of an offense defined by 
Pennsylvania law, the Superior Court held the trial court’s 
charge did not warrant counsel’s objection.  We conclude that 
this holding constitutes an unreasonable application of 
Strickland.  While we recognize there are “countless ways to 
provide effective assistance in any given case,” we cannot 
fathom a strategic reason for counsel’s failure to object to an 
instruction that eliminates the state’s burden to prove an 
element of a crime that carries a mandatory sentence of life 
imprisonment.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  Even if we 
“evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time,” 
we hold his inaction constituted a serious enough error that his 
representation fell outside the “‘wide range’ of reasonable 
professional assistance.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 104 (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).  Given the nature and 
circumstances of this particular instruction, the state court’s 
finding to the contrary constitutes an unreasonable application 
of clearly established law.  
  
 
crime.  Id. at 1238 (citing 18 Pa.C.S. § 903). If a different crime 
is committed in furtherance of the agreed-upon crime – for 
example, if a bank guard is killed while the agreed-upon bank 
robbery is underway -- a co-conspirator is liable for the murder. 
See Commonwealth v. Strantz, 195 A. 75, 79 (1937).  An 
accomplice in the same circumstance, however, is guilty of 
murder only if he intended to aid or promote the shooting of 
the bank guard and had the same kind of culpability as the 




 B. Prejudice   
 We now turn to Strickland’s prejudice prong.  To 
establish prejudice, Tyson must prove “a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  
Counsel’s errors must be “so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at 
687.  Under Strickland, “[t]he likelihood of a different result 
must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Harrington, 562 
U.S. at 112. 
 Here, the Pennsylvania Superior Court did not assess 
whether Tyson suffered prejudice because it found counsel’s 
performance reasonable.  Tyson, as a habeas petitioner, must 
nonetheless meet his burden under AEDPA review of 
“showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to 
deny relief.”  Harrington, 562 U.S. at 98; see also id. (AEDPA 
review “applies when a ‘claim,’ not a component of one, has 
been adjudicated.”).  The question is not whether a finding of 
no prejudice would have been incorrect, it is whether such a 
decision would have been unreasonable, which is “a 
substantially higher threshold.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 
U.S. 111, 123 (2009). 
 We have already concluded that counsel’s failure to 
object to the court’s instruction led to the likelihood that the 
jury interpreted the law in a way that lessened the 
Commonwealth’s burden of proof.  Tyson appears to argue that 
reaching this conclusion is enough to establish prejudice.  But 
AEDPA review demands a more comprehensive analysis to 
determine whether it would be unreasonable to find the 
 
 28 
instruction did not render Tyson’s conviction unfair.  
Harrington, 562 U.S. at 111-12.  We therefore look to the 
record to determine whether the instruction interfered with the 
jury’s assessment of the evidence to the extent that, but for the 
incorrect statements of law, there is a substantial likelihood 
that a different verdict would have been reached. Id. at 112.  
 In denying relief, the Superior Court adopted the PCRA 
court’s characterization of the evidence as “reveal[ing] that 
[Tyson’s] conduct was willful, deliberate and premeditated and 
that he actively participated in the murders by aiding the 
shooter.”  A-51.  While the state courts correctly recognized 
Tyson’s intent to kill could be proven through circumstantial 
evidence, they ignored circumstantial evidence that could have 
supported the opposite conclusion.  Kasine George, the only 
eyewitness to testify, stated that Tyson handed his gun to 
Powell at Powell’s request as they followed the Fotiathis 
brothers’ van.  Once the van stopped, Tyson stopped the car in 
a nearby alley and Powell exited the car with the gun.  When 
George and Tyson started to join him, Powell stopped them and 
told them to wait in the car.  Rather than accompany Powell, 
George and Tyson stayed behind while Powell went alone and 
shot the victims.  George testified that he anticipated a 
confrontation, but that neither Tyson nor Powell discussed any 
intention to kill the Fotiathis brothers.  George stated that, 
while following behind the disabled van, they never discussed 
a plan for when they eventually caught up with and 
encountered the victims.  From this account, a jury could have 
reasonably concluded that Tyson, like George, anticipated a 
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confrontation of some kind but that Powell alone possessed the 
intent to kill.9  
 At trial, counsel recognized the absence of any concrete 
evidence of Tyson’s intention to commit murder.  In moving 
for a judgment of acquittal on the accomplice to first-degree 
murder charge, counsel argued that George’s testimony failed 
to establish “any express or real implied agreement” that the 
men were “going to, in fact, kill the Fotiathis brothers.”  A-
849.  The trial court denied the motion, finding that an intent 
to kill could be inferred by the circumstances.10  In light of this 
exchange, counsel’s failure to object to the instruction, which 
did not require the jury to find any agreement to kill, is 
inexplicable.  Had counsel requested the court include the mens 
rea element of accomplice liability in its instruction, there is a 
substantial probability that the jury could have found that 
Tyson lacked the intent to kill. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-6.  
Because the deficient instruction hindered the jury’s 
assessment of important circumstantial evidence, it would be 
unreasonable to conclude that Tyson was not prejudiced by 
counsel’s failure to object.  See, e.g., Bey, 856 F.3d at 244 
(finding that Bey was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object 
to a deficient instruction).  
 
9 The lead detective on the case, Detective Richard Wolbert, 
stated that Kasine George provided the “best information” 
regarding Tyson’s role in the shooting.  A-823.  
 
10 In denying the motion, the court acknowledged George’s 
testimony that Tyson gave his gun to Powell prior to the 
shooting.  The trial court, in rejecting counsel’s argument that 
there was no agreement as to what to do with the gun, replied, 
“[t]hey were not deer hunting.”  A-0850.  
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 This case is distinguishable from our decision in 
Mathias, which held a state court’s denial of an ineffective 
assistance claim arising from an alleged erroneous instruction 
was reasonable under AEDPA review.  The instruction in 
Mathias, which the petitioner claimed allowed him to be 
convicted of first-degree murder without a finding of specific 
intent, made inconsistent statements regarding accomplice 
liability, with some portions properly instructing jurors to find 
shared intent and others incorrectly implying the principal’s 
intent to kill was grounds for convicting the accomplice.  
Mathias, 876 F.3d at 467, 478.  Reading the instruction as a 
whole, the state court concluded that Mathias’ due process 
claim would not have succeeded on appeal because portions of 
the instruction “properly articulated the specific intent 
requirement.”  Id. at 478-79.  In reviewing this decision under 
AEDPA, the Mathias Court found that “tension between” 
Supreme Court decisions addressing “ambiguous” jury 
instructions meant the denial of the ineffective assistance claim 
did not constitute an unreasonable application of Strickland.  
Id. at 478 -9. 
 Here, we find no such tension in federal law that would 
allow the Superior Court’s denial of Tyson’s claim to 
withstand even AEDPA’s deferential review.  The instruction 
was not ambiguous.  It instead provided a consistently 
incorrect statement of the law that in effect absolved the 
prosecution from having to prove a key element of the status 
of an accomplice to first-degree murder.  Unlike the instruction 
in Mathias, no portion of the instruction articulated the correct 
mens rea.  The Commonwealth cited the instruction at length 
and stated that accomplice liability instruction was rooted 
“within [the] context of the actual charge of first-degree 
murder.”  Br. Appellee, 14.  The plain text of the instruction, 
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however, shows that the charge of first-degree murder did not 
articulate the intent requirement of the accomplice.  Given the 
likelihood that the jury here convicted Tyson on the mistaken 
belief that the mens rea for first-degree murder did not apply 
to him, we cannot find the conclusory reasoning of the state 
court amounted to a reasonable application of Strickland.  
IV. Conclusion 
 Because the court’s instruction did not require the 
Commonwealth to meet its burden of proof, we find counsel’s 
failure to object constituted deficient representation.  Tyson 
established prejudice because there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for his counsel’s inaction, he would not have been 
convicted as an accomplice to first-degree murder and 
sentenced to life in prison.  The profound errors in the 
instruction were compounded by the prosecutor’s misguided 
closing argument and the inconclusive circumstantial evidence 
presented to the jury, rendering the state court’s finding that 
counsel was not ineffective to be an unreasonable application 
of Strickland.   
 We will therefore reverse the District Court’s order 
denying habeas corpus relief and remand with instructions to 
grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus regarding Tyson’s 
conviction for accomplice to first-degree murder so that the 
matter may be remanded to state court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.   
